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Mind Over Matter,
Matter Over Mind:
Phallusophy and Diotima
Anna Juan
Bucknell University
Men get laid, but women get screwed.
–Quentin Crisp

The age-old notion of the “reign of the phallus” has presided over
much of the course of human history and pre-history. Women joyfully
embracing Bacchantic practices and cavorting with satyrs in various
images of ancient Greek art attests to that fact; and the women of today
who do not earn the same “dollar” as their male colleagues, for example,
serve to continue that tradition. However, within Plato’s Symposium,
there resides a progressive mind among the sea of Y-chromosomes in the
guise of Diotima, a woman who teaches Socrates the “art of love.” Not only
does she infiltrate the male sphere by her mere feminine presence, but she
also acts as the figure that makes reachable what the men have placed
upon a pedestal: the possibility of “reproduction” through Love. With
regards to the maleness of the philosophic profession, she aims to universalize the concept of Love. It is no longer solely a male venue, but one
which can be of use to the whole of human race, rather than focusing on
the “reign” of men who aim to define it specifically.
The Symposium itself is a phallic practice: men match their wits by
using eloquence of language and argument as they make merry in the
midst of wine, women, and song. It can be paralleled with a typical
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American Super Bowl party (sans the nonexistent brevity of ancient Greek
pontification which would probably ruin the game!) As a woman, Diotima
supposedly represents the insatiable sexual drive of women, which is a risk
to the balance of a sophrosyne-practicing male majority. However,
Diotima does not present an invasive threat to the masculine setting of the
symposium. Rather, she serves to speak on behalf of her belief pertaining
to the nature of Love. Thus, she enters the symposium as challenging the
realm of men already: she offers discourse on a topic that they have chosen, while keeping a distance from the physicality of her Being as a temptation to them. She takes into account the others’ arguments in a passiveaggressive fashion; she calmly questions, rather than using her sexuality
as possible power over them.
In her argument, Diotima aims to characterize Love by means of
“reproduction and birth in beauty” (Plato 53). Reproduction, here, must
be discussed by Diotima herself: the female, in her possession of a womb,
is the only one able to see to it that reproduction is carried out. Men simply supply the means of being able to engender. They will always lack the
ability to physically understand birth. Reproduction, Diotima says, is
ongoing: “it is what mortals have in place of immortality” (Plato 54). So,
if “a lover must desire immortality along with the good,” then Love is eternally connected to virtue, whose reward is immortality. She also speaks
about possibility of a “virtuous man” to reproduce. He “conceives and
gives birth to what he has been carrying inside him for ages,” (Plato 57)
which is the idea, inspired by the beauty of a subject. Diotima acts as a
contrast for the male here, in the sense that she represents what they are
trying to imitate.
There is an instance of Lochrie’s “queer practice” here: the male
wishes to take on “various strategies by which makes, in many different
cultures, arrogate to themselves the power and prestige of female
(pro)creativity” (Halperin 285). Halperin presents the possibility that the
male desires to have a vagina. It seems to be a reversal of the “penis envy”
that is attributed to Greek women of the time, who were obsessed with filling their “vaginal void”, depicted as jumping joyfully into baskets full of
obscenely large phalloi. Diotima’s insistence on the importance of the
ejection of the construct of Love (in this case, the idea), its birthing, further strengthens the aim of Diotima to bring the two sexes together. One
would err in saying that she gives the female any more access to the male
world; rather, she denigrates the status of men in their desire to be like the
women that they are so determined to subjugate and control.
Diotima can also be viewed within Galen’s lens of the human being
during ancient Greek times, which is exemplified by the one-sex model.
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He compares the difference between female genitalia with that of the eyes
of a mole.
The eyes of the mole have the same structures as
the eyes of other animals except that they do not
allow the mole to see. They do not open, “nor do
they project but are left there imperfect.” So too
the female genitalia “do not open” and remain an
imperfect version of what they would be were
they thrust out. (Laqueur 28)
Hence, the male and female that are presented here appear as a
“freakish variety” (Laqueur 28) of each other. It is important to note that
Diotima is a “freakish variety” of Socrates himself; she speaks through his
voice and, in essence, acts as his contribution to the symposium. Another
incidence of “queering” takes place: she plays the role of the man without
physically being there; here, Socrates acts as the “thrust out” organ for the
(feminine) internalized idea. Halperin’s theory of the “active” and “passive” roles can be applied in this situation.
sex was not conceived as a collective enterprise in which two or
more persons jointly engaged, but as an action performed by one
person upon another; sex therefore effectively divided, classified,
and distributed its participants into distinct and radically opposed
categories (“penetrator vs. “penetrated”) (Halperin 266)
Here, conversely, the theory is reversed: Diotima is the active speaker,
while Socrates is the passive vessel.
It is also important to note that Diotima does not mention women
as her subject; it is not Plato’s aim for her to speak for women in general
(Halperin 295).
Nothing in herself, “woman” is that pseudo-Other who both makes
good what men want and exempts men from wanting anything at
all; she is an alternate male identity whose constant accessibility to
men lends men a fullness and totality that enables them to dispense…with otherness altogether. (Halperin 297)
It is true that Diotima is defined within the male realm of the symposium,
and she only appears to give her argument. She does not proposition
Socrates as Alcibiades does, but demonstrates a reserve that is uncharacteristic of the typical female depiction of the time. She contrasts with the
Bacchantic figures of the flute girls as an entity that Socrates himself
respects for her intelligence and offer of teaching. Diotima is actually
never discussed without mention of Socrates: they seem to appear as a
whole. This occurrence in itself does indeed prove Halperin’s argument,
but also promotes the idea of universality in the sexes. Some theories that
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Diotima never existed prevail, but it is in her existence as the Other that is
merged with Socrates, the one who defines her, that makes the construct
powerful. Diotima is within Socrates (whether imagined or as a memory),
and femininity cannot heretofore be considered a separate individual from
him, which essentially implies a merging of the sexes.
The one-sex model, conclusively, is rather ambivalent. If “the vagina [is] an eternally…unborn penis [and] the womb a stunted scrotum,”
then is it not possible that the penis can represent an inside-out vagina?
(Laqueur 28) In turn, one must consider whether or not this bi-conditional inversion proves to be a detrimental aspect within this argument: does
it not follow that if women are simply inverted men, then are they not simply abnormal men who want to be penetrated by their normal selves?
Both sexes have an inherent desire to be penetrated when this bi-conditional is applied: men have their “phallic void” as possessors of an inverted vagina, thus paralleling the supposed characteristic of women having
an unquenchable sexual vigor. Again, equalization occurs within the onesex model, which hearkens back to Diotima’s aim to lessen the disparity
between the sexes.
The issue that naturally follows, then, is the discrepancy between
male desire for women and for Athenian adolescents. How would the
(supposedly) gender-universalized man now choose between the woman,
who would fill his hypothetical “phallic void” and the young boy through
whom he must birth his brainchild? The man must bear in mind his own
attempt at practicing sophrosyne; after all, they must uphold their social
status, and the fact that sex is not a private thing. The later example of the
lex Julia exhibits this societal “problem”: the penetration of a male is punishable by death, and a woman is only protected by the law depending on
her degree of usefulness to the whole of society. A similar phenomenon of
the male as desiring to control the female productivity and activity is again
manifested in this attempt to hold back the desire of the female. Males are
protected by the law only until they are penetrated—they then become
women who cannot practice sophrosyne and will no longer positively contribute to the polis.
This, however, does not reconcile the inevitable choice that is made
by any “virtuous man.” The lack of availability of the role of pederast to
the woman therefore hands her the short end of the leash in that, despite
the equalizing of gender attempted by Diotima, they still do not possess
the power to give knowledge. They simply engage in “erotic desire [consisting] of excitation brought on by pregnancy and climaxing in the ejaculation of a baby” (Halperin 281). Oddly enough, reproduction (which
places them in a state that men cannot attain) is the very element in their
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sexuality that does not allow them to fully complete the circle of equalization.
One must consider the how well the phallus is “reigning” with
respect to the arguments that have been put forth. There seems to be a
dichotomy between seeming to reign and the façade that the phallus hides
behind. Socrates, who, in essence, taints Diotima’s discourse with the
presence of his maleness, is in turn castrated by her femaleness. A double
“castration,” happens here. The “reign of the phallus” is made effeminate
in paralleling with women, but it is important to remember that the female
does not grow a phallus in response. She remains “the penetrated”: she is
“both active and passive at once, both [a subject and object] of desire”
(Halperin 270). Despite the fact that Diotima participates in pederasty in
the case of Socrates, she remains only behind him, contaminated by the
sheer usage of his voice as hers: she is still the Other. However, the fact
that the female Other, defined by the normative male, continues to exist
outside the realm of defined “authentic femininity” (Halperin 297) still
prevails. It has yet to occur: this is its advantage over the male. Their masculinity is already defined, while femininity has yet to truly challenge its
supposed “reign.”
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